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Instrumental Speeches, Morality, and
Masculine Agency among Muinane People
(Colombian Amazon)
CARLOS DAVID LONDOÑO SULKIN
University of Regina
carlos.londono@uregina.ca

INTRODUCTION
This is a paper concerned with matters of morality, particularly with
how “People of the Center” (Medio Caquetá region, Colombian Amazon)1
talked about the admirable, the worthy, the despicable, and the evil in agents’
practices, actions and subjectivities.  It features an abstract discussion that
presents my own interpretive, schematic synthesis of People of the Center’s
understandings or accounts of morality and cosmology, but also and more
centrally addresses how individuals reflected on these accounts and used
them intelligently, reiterating them, contesting them, and transforming
them.2  Men and women among Muinane and other People of the Center
produced numerous discursive depictions of themselves, of others, and of
their interactions, often concerning their own competence and morality
or others’ lacks thereof.   These moral portrayals of themselves and of
others—whether in the form of brief anecdotes or longer narratives—were
told to me frequently and explicitly during the time I spent in Muinane
communities.   As a result, I soon lost my initial culture shock at such
apparent immodesty and shrewishness.   I started to think about such
moral portrayals as a matter of puzzlement and then focused on them as
examples of people citing much-used narrative frames and symbols.   In
this paper I attend selectively to a particular set of portrayals and practices
that pertain mainly to men: those concerning forms of knowledge that
Muinane people deemed their own and different from other people’s.  
In this regard the mambeadores (adult men who consumed ritually the
substance mambe3) stressed the great amount of knowledge they possessed,
the authentically Muinane or patrilineal character of this knowledge, the
propriety of their processes of acquisition of it, the legitimacy of their use
of it, its effectiveness, and the respect and fear others had of them because
of it.   Women too produced numerous self-depictions, but expressed
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less of an obsession with their own agency, and no claims to dangerous
knowledge.   Most of the People of the Center I knew—both men and
women—also produced numerous negative evaluations of other people,
concerning the same issues.  They surreptitiously and openly denied the
amount, effectiveness, and legitimacy of others’ knowledge, good will,
formal correctness, and so on.  They often found “proof ” of others’ lack of
knowledge and of their misdemeanors.  
I was curious about why individuals among the People of the Center
produced such moral portrayals, and about what these expressions achieved.  
I will attempt here to make the case that they were motivated by a certain
ideal of agency, a sense of what was admirable or desirable in human
subjectivity and action, tied to their awareness of the possibility that their
own actions and subjectivities would be framed as immoral, animalistic or
otherwise inadequate by others around them.  The latter interpretations,
often voiced critically, were always a risk among them4 (see Storrie intra,
on people’s judgments of claims to awesome shamanic power).
Individuals among the People of the Center produced moral selfportrayals reflexively, at times with self-conscious intent to persuade, yet
usually without questioning the given nature of the performative categories
posited by the vocabulary in which these portrayals were couched.  They
were very aware that their ways and actions were likely to be evaluated
by others, and in fact many of their moral self-portrayals took the form
of quotations of what others—kin, but also the dead and other kinds of
beings—had purportedly said about them.   My conviction is that these
discourses—along with other discursive and nondiscursive practices of
knowledge that featured or were spoken of with a detailed vocabulary
of strong moral evaluation5 —created and recreated the very nature and
intelligibility of the kinds of agents People of the Center understood they
were or could be.  Furthermore, these kinds of agents were intelligible to the
People of the Center in the frame of a certain kind of cosmos, constructed
dialogically through the same reiterative symbolic deployments that
constructed the agents.  Part of what persuades me that this was so was the
great coherence—or even identity—between People of the Center’s ways
of acting upon the world “out there,” their ways of acting upon individuals’
bodies and subjectivities, and their reflexive talk concerning these matters
and their own and others’ actions.  These pictures of the world, of agency
and of subjectivity within them, were compelling.  People appeared to feel,
and they certainly interacted, in ways that cohered with a very unique,
complex kind of cosmos.  This life indeed had a hold on them.6
I argue that a “thick” understanding of social life of the People of the
Center—including in its dense complexity the moral self-portrayals that first

2

Instrumental Speeches, Morality, and Masculine Agency among Muina

Instrumental Speeches, Morality & Masculine Agency

201

engaged my curiosity, but also more “traditional” anthropological matters
such as the vicissitudes of their social organization or cosmology—requires
attention to the subjectivity of individuals, to their motivations, and to their
self-interpretations, all of which were partly shaped and constituted by their
articulated understandings of agency, emotions, morality, and so forth.  I
cannot produce a watertight causal account of how the picture of agency
in question came to have a hold upon people, how it was transformed into
individuals’ desires or callings, into the experienced wish or aspiration to
be a certain kind of agent or to be perceived as such.  I assume the position
that my understandings of the subjectivities of individual People of the
Center are inevitably based on my understandings of my own subjectivity,
which itself is formed in social interaction.   I experience many of my
beliefs, desires, and motivations as manifestly obvious.  Probably because
of the symbolic forms that I have acquired over the course of my life that
constitute or shape my interpretations, I simply see that certain forms of
action and subjectivity, as well as certain personal styles are desirable and
worthy.  Seeing them in this way constitutes a motivation to act in a certain
way.  I also have a clear sense that many of my actions depend on choices
and decisions I make reflexively, employing distinctions of worth.  Because
I recognize this in my own action, I suppose that other people act, often
reflexively, on the basis of their understandings (or misunderstandings)
of themselves and of the world.7  They too see (and intimately believe)
that certain forms of action and subjectivity are admirable or despicable,
though these may well differ from the forms I admire or despise.
In the pages that follow, I will present my synthetic interpretation
of People of the Center’s—sometimes specifically Muinane’s—accounts
of how the “knowledge of our own” and associated practices relate with
their cosmos, social organization, subjectivities and understandings of
agency.  I will then turn to an examination of the moral issues pertaining
to knowledge, as expressed in individuals’ morally evaluative portrayals of
their own and others’ actions and agencies.
ACCOUNTS OF SELVES, THE COSMOS, AND AGENCY
Muinane people’s talk often depicted or alluded to a cosmos densely
populated by a variety of suprahuman, human, and pseudo- or infrahuman
agents.  Such talk also segregated these beings on moral grounds.  Although
in some ways many had some features of humanity, only miyámiinaha—
literally meaning “Real People” (Muinane and those akin to them)—were
proper human beings with the capacity to live as such beings should.  
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Animals and some other kinds of beings to some extent perhaps viewed
themselves as human, but failed on moral grounds to achieve true humanity.  
Individuals expressed this moral classification most saliently in the form of
manifest evaluations of immoral action on the part of people to whom they
attributed animalistic thoughts/emotions (see Londoño Sulkin 2005:7–
30).  
According to several mambeadores I asked, the ultimate purpose of
human life was to reproduce “humanity”—a term that could encompass
the kinship group, People of the Center, or the human species more
generally.  This reproduction involved the intentional manufacture of new
people endowed with the sociable subjectivities and competent bodies
necessary to conduct community life as it should be conducted: interacting
coolly and caringly in everyday life.  The constitution of individual Real
People was thus a central and often explicit concern in much social action.  
Many standard activities in Muinane people’s lives—whether quotidian
or occasional, ceremonial or not—related to this.  A common premise of
much of what they said and did was that people’s material constitution,
by the substances that they stated made up the body, determined their
subjectivities and agencies.   Key cultivated substances such as tobacco,
coca, hot chilies, manioc and so forth were made into human flesh through
rituals and through simple consumption in everyday life; these substances,
of divine origin and endowed with their own subjectivities and agencies,
“spoke through” people, generating their moral thoughts/emotions and
bodily sensations.  
The very materiality of people’s subjectivities and agencies made
them vulnerable to the evil of animals and other inhuman beings, whom
my interlocutors among People of the Center often accused of placing
their own perverse, subjectivity-endowing substances inside people, or
otherwise impinging upon people’s bodily health.   On several occasions
I witnessed, when people became physically incapable of contributing to
the material well-being of the community, or else behaved in antisocial
fashions, others and at times they themselves would claim that this was the
result of an animal’s usurpation of their thoughts/emotions, and of their
speech.  People’s actions were often the matter of contested interpretations,
concerning whether they were proper human conduct or rather the product
of the immoral, beastly usurpation of their subjectivities.  Their perspectival
cosmology—where beings perceive themselves and those with bodies
like their own as “human”—provided a frame in which such accusations
were plausible.  People with animalistic subjectivities could perceive other
beings who had bodies like their own as “human,” but would mistreat
them in the fashion that animals and other inhuman beings mistreated
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their co-specifics, whom they too perceived as “human” (see Londoño
Sulkin 2005:7–30, for a more thorough discussion of Viveiros de Castro’s
1998 essay on perspectivism).   In the context of communities in which
such accusations were rife, people invested much in highlighting their own
consistent humanity and morality, to preempt unfavorable interpretations.  
(For further discussion on perspectivism, see Belaunde, Lagrou, Rosengren,
Santos-Granero, Storrie, and Werlang, all intra.)
What I interpret to be People of the Center’s understanding of their
own agency—an important part of which was the capacity to manipulate
substances or their bearers either materially or through persuasion—is built
upon first, the premises of the materiality of moral thoughts/emotions and
properly shaped bodies and of their corrupt counterparts, and second, upon
the subjectivity of the bearers of these materials.  This capacity stemmed
from key substances such as tobacco paste, coca, hot chilies, water, herbs,
and others that were agents in their own right and endowed with their
own intentionality.  Many of the manipulations in question were conceived
as predatory transformations that involved dealing out death.  Tobacco,
itself a powerful predator, was perhaps the most important source of such
predatory agency.  In constituting people’s bodies it provided them not only
with thoughts/emotions, but also with some of its predatory capabilities.  
Furthermore, people—mainly the mambeadores, but for a few purposes
some women as well—used what I call instrumental “Speeches,” the
Speeches of Life, of Healing, of Apprising, of Work, of Felling, of Maloca
Construction, of Pain and others, with their protocols and conditions, to
direct the agency of the tobacco they consumed so that it would prey upon
evil agents and their substances, and thereby transform them with some
people-making or community-making purpose (on such purposes, see
Londoño Sulkin 2000:170–186 and 2001:434; and Overing and Passes
2000).  
The instrumental Speeches were part of what People of the Center
referred to in Spanish as el conocimiento propio, the “knowledge of our
own.”8   In my experience, Muinane people used the term “knowledge
of our own” mostly to contrast it with the Speeches and other privileged
discourses and techniques of white men.   I should note parenthetically
that most Muinane men possessed some “knowledge of our own,” but by
the time I did my fieldwork there were no specialized shamans alive of the
kind called kakúminaha (sucking people), who were reportedly capable of
extracting diseases from people through suction.  Some Muinane people
did recognize certain known Matapí, Yukuna, Uitoto, Okaina, and Makuna
individuals to be specialized healers or sorcerers.9
The different instrumental Speeches pertained to numerous fields
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of endeavour and to different moments in life.  They were more or less
formulaic utterances that mambeadores understood to act in different ways
to change some aspect of the world.   My interlocutors made different
claims about them—that they were the very speech of the creator deity
sounding directly through the speaker, or that they were “recordings” (akin
to those on a cassette tape) of the Creator’s words, or that they directed the
attention of the creator deity to some transformation that people wanted
him (or her, depending on the clan of the person telling the story) to
carry out.  Alternatively the spoken utterances themselves were deemed
to be powerful, or somehow able to harness the agency of substances (for
a similar description of people using alternative accounts, see Tambiah
1968:183).
Real People’s transformations of misanthropic agents, their substances,
their thoughts/emotions and their agencies into their proper human
counterparts seemed to involve two main forms of manipulation.   One
was the material manipulation of substances and agents, or of substancelike agencies, thoughts/emotions and tribulations.  The other form was
the social manipulation of subjectivity-endowed beings, which often led
to their effecting material manipulations.  
The manipulation of agents and substances was often a matter of what
I have called “divine performativity” (following Butler 1993:12, 13).  For
the case of Muinane people’s practices, I will define this as the capacity of
agents to bring about transformations in the world by means of naming
or otherwise describing these transformations.  The effects named come
to be in virtue of the will of the subject that does the naming.  A common
example of such divine performativity took place in most evening rituals
in Muinane mambeaderos, which usually involved the recapitulation of the
evils that had affected the community that day, or that could do so on the
following one.  Each of these evils was then dealt with in the mambeadores’
rhythmic dialogues, which at some stage involved lists of statements,
including metalinguistic ones about the statements’ effectiveness that
affirmed that these evils were being swept away, proscribed, or blown
away.10
Another form of divine performativity was the use of “naming.”  
Ovikihi (to aim), mómonihi (to name), and ímijisuhi (to name into good/
beautiful), were several forms of naming that Muinane people understood
to generate the effects named.   An example of such performativity was
the “naming of the flesh” of certain dangerous fish, transforming the fish
into manioc.  People understood this to transform the original substance,
pre-empting its more dangerous characteristics.   The fish’s pathogenic
features were disarmed because processed manioc was not pathogenic.  
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Several of my mambeadero interlocutors were explicit about the fact that
naming could be very dangerous, and much more so when effected by
knowledgeable elders such as themselves, empowered with tobacco and
coca.  Immanuel broached this matter after reproaching me one time for
calling an airplane a “fire eagle” (kííjigai mogáje), the term that some other
clans used for planes.  He said, “Do not name it that way … that is why
they fall and burn!  Call it kámoga (“canoe of the heights”).11
Many salient endeavors among Muinane and other People of the
Center made some use or another of this transformative, predatory agency
(Echeverri 2000; Londoño Sulkin 2000 and 2001b; Overing and Passes
2000).   Food and ritual substance preparations were often spoken of as
filtering or purifying processes in which some agent—water, fire, or some
other subjectivity-endowed substance or object—killed, destroyed, or
otherwise did away with pathogens in the original stuff, leaving only a
purified desirable essence.  The felling and burning of the forest to make a
garden was treated in the Speech of Felling as a human war against trees,
or alternatively as a meal in which the deities of tobacco, axes and fire all
“ate” evil trees, transforming them into fertile ashes from which desirable
substances would grow.  Speeches of Healing that dealt with disease usually
involved the use of tobacco paste and coca, understood in the first place
to be the source and power of knowledge, and then to be predators that
transformed the evil substances affecting the sick and placed them again
in the animals that had originated them.  These animals then became easy
prey for people.   Finally, the building of malocas (traditional ceremonial
and residential houses) involved numerous transformations of diseases and
negative affects into elements of the house, and the “domestication” of
evil agents such as the great trees that became house pillars or drums.  
According to mambeadores’ metacommentaries on the Speech of Maloca
Construction, once it transformed them into a house, these elements
became protective guardians that ensured the health and fertility of the
maloca’s inhabitants.  
Such views of the cosmos and of agency within it appeared often in
People of the Center’s emotional talk and moral portrayals.   It always
seemed to me to be an intimately persuasive account of experienced
thoughts/emotions, and elsewhere I discuss in detail cases of people
deeming their own and others’ behaviors to be the product of animalistic
usurpation of proper human thoughts/emotions.  The possibility of such
usurpation contextualized claims to knowledge, morality and agency, for
it was both the main object of the intentional use of knowledge, and the
main claim in critiques of allegedly immoral behavior.   The claims in
question also seemed to me to convey the deep aesthetic involvement of
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People of the Center (especially the men) with a certain picture of agency
that involved on the one hand manifesting great tranquility, competent
sociability and concerned care for others, and on the other a capacity for
esoterically violent predatory action.  
THE MORAL CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE
Muinane and other People of the Center’s self-depictions and critiques,
as well as the Speeches themselves and other discourses, tied together the
morality and efficacy of individuals’ uses of Speeches.  One axiom I found
them to express was that if Speeches were immorally transmitted, acquired,
or deployed, they would not function well.   If deployed in a formally
correct manner and from a moral position, they would necessarily produce
desirable results.  Similarly, a general moral condition of knowledge was
that it be used for a proper purpose, and conversely, such purpose could only
be achieved if the necessary knowledge was deployed morally.  However,
whether a particular instance of the transmission, use or acquisition of some
knowledge was moral or not was obviously a question of interpretation and
at times of negotiation.  In any case, people produced numerous claims to
the morality of their uses of knowledge, and also many contestations of
others’ claims.  
Ultimately, knowledge—namely, Speeches—could only be gauged
as “true” (míya-) a posteriori, when it “dawned” or “made something be
seen,” that is, when its effects became materially perceptible and beneficial.  
Several mambeadores affirmed that the only “true” knowledge was that
which pertained to the Cool Path or Path of Life.  This “path” led from
the maloca to the garden.  According to Pedro’s explanation of this claim,
it meant that the only worthwhile knowledge involved the production of
foodstuffs and ritual substances, and through these, in the multiplication
of Real People.  True Speeches led to material abundance, satiety, good
health, tranquil community life and demographic increase.12
In oft-repeated abstract accounts, a mambeador who had plenty of
mambe and tobacco paste showed, by virtue of his possession of such
substances, that his Speeches had “dawned” and that he was indeed a
moral, knowledgeable person.   Along similar lines, men and women of
the Center told me on different occasions that a woman who possessed
a beautiful, well-weeded garden and who always had an abundance of
foodstuffs available showed that she indeed knew the counsels of the
Speech of Advice and was therefore a “true woman.”  In abstract accounts,
the existence of well-behaved, healthy children and grandchildren was also
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deemed evidence of knowledge dawning.  These abstractions were often
concretized in evaluations of individuals.
Pablo and other mambeadores stated that a person could know every
counsel of the Speech of Advice or a great many Speeches of Apprising,
in the sense of having consigned them to memory.  But, if his knowledge
did not result in well-behaved children, in the healing of diseases, or in
the production of foodstuffs and ritual substances, others would claim
that he did not really know, and that his Speeches were lies.  So merely
memorized recipes and Speeches were not in themselves true knowledge.  
True knowledge was that which the individual had not only committed to
memory but had furthermore made dawn.  
Failures to make knowledge dawn were a matter of much attention
and denunciation.  Jonás’s was a case in point: people claimed that he was
very knowledgeable of Speeches of Apprising, and that he was a pleasant
man and a competent interlocutor in a mambeadero. Nonetheless, they also
claimed that his knowledge was false, for his very lifestyle of itinerancy and
material poverty showed that his beautiful Speeches had not dawned.13  In
another instance, Jafet likened David to jaguars and anacondas, who in a
certain Speech of Apprising appeared as leaders whose Speeches sounded
beautiful, but were mere false appearance.  They did not dawn, but instead
led to death, hunger, and other tribulations for their people.
If moral knowledge pertained to the Cool Path, and in general to the
production of Real People, its spurious counterpart was sorcery.  Sorcery
was dangerous, immoral knowledge that led to the destruction of people
and communities, but it also pleased those who lacked discernment because
of its great destructive efficacy.  Saul told me a certain part of a Speech of
Apprising that stressed the clear contrast between proper knowledge and
sorcery.  It followed a moral self-portrayal in which he claimed to reject
sorcery.  The Apprising went something like this:
At First Time, some animals claimed that the creator’s True Speech was not
true.  They preferred to explore sorcerous knowledge, and collected substances
for sorcery.  Soon, however, they found themselves hungry and incapable of
producing food.  They sought the creator to beg him for manioc and other
garden produce.  He told them, “Eat your sorcery stones!”  They answered,
“Those stones do not bring satiety!”  “Then why do you use them at all?!” he
demanded angrily, and then condemned them to a miserable life of scavenging
and eating filth, and to be game animals for Real People to eat.

Again, this mythical event highlighted that the proper use of knowledge
was for production that led to satiety—a state of cool satisfaction—and
derogated its misuse for the purposes of sorcery.   Sorcery did produce
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results, but these were ultimately detrimental to the user.  
Whether a certain use of knowledge was moral or sorcerous was not
always clear.  As with other moral aspects of knowledge, it was in fact a
matter open to contestation.  For instance, whereas Immanuel found that
his use of his animal tooth-and-claw necklace in predatory healing rites was
the irreproachable harnessing of evil agents he himself had domesticated
(and thus moralized), Pedro and Pablo found it to be trafficking with evil
agents, and therefore to be sorcerous.  They liked Immanuel well enough,
but stated that the day would come when the beings of the necklace would
kill him.  
There was an almost standardized autobiographical anecdote among
Muinane men concerning their rejection of sorcery.  I heard independent
versions from Immanuel and Saul, and then from several young Uitoto and
Muinane men.  They told me about their ignorant and innocent youth,
when they had been interested in acquiring sorcerous knowledge with
which to harm enemies, or in hearing about it.  Each had asked his father
or some other elder about this.  The wiser elder had advised each overly
eager youth against such deadly interests, which led to no production.  In
each case, the elder had instructed the youth to “look at where those who
used sorcery ended up.”  Invariably, in the myths and histories alluded to,
sorcerers had died awful deaths and their lineages had come to tragic ends.  
I am not sure that these pedagogical events actually transpired in each of
their personal histories.   Rather, I believe that oft-repeated stories such
as this one, which involved interactions between stereotypical characters
(e.g., overly eager and ignorant youths and wise elders) reiterated key
contrasts and associations of a vocabulary of moral evaluations central to
people’s accounts of themselves.  Their frequent repetition and their moral
plausibility made them an intimate part of their lives.  What was important
about them, after all, was that they were moral truths.14
The self-portrayals and criticisms of People of the Center concerning
knowledge very often highlighted one or several other moral and aesthetic
considerations.  Such considerations were often premised on the agential
character of the Speeches, which were understood to be prone to anger,
disgust, jealousy, and sulking when mistreated.  In such cases, “morality”
was a matter of treating an agent respectfully, for instrumental purposes.  
In other cases, though, people’s portrayals highlighted their own coolness,
benevolence, discipline, and correctness in matters of knowledge, and
bracketed the intrinsic agency of the Speeches.  
The formal correctness of deployments of knowledge was always a
salient consideration.  There was much rhetoric about the requirement of
using Speeches only when needed, and in the correct place, at the right
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time, and with the appropriate accoutrements.  The claims could posit that
the Speeches themselves required it, as agents, or else they could simply
highlight the virtuous orthodoxy of the person.  One formal requirement
of many Speeches was that they be deployed in the form of dialogues.  
Individuals often emitted judgments of particular instances of speech
deployment, or of their own and others’ talents in this regard.   Pablo,
for instance, told me his son lacked the ability to “give him strength” in
dialogue.  I witnessed one dialogue between them and found that, indeed,
the son lacked expertise as a what-sayer, because he merely answered
his father with “hmmms” rather than with the more varied repertoire of
responses of an experienced interlocutor.  This lack of skill constituted an
aesthetic problem, but it had implications concerning the efficacy of the
Speeches deployed, as well as the public evaluation of Pablo and of his son.  
People spoke critically about them, saying that Pablo had not raised his
children properly in that regard, and that his son had not been attentive to
the ways of the clan.  
Another common moral claim of individuals was that they had acquired
their knowledge properly: from the right elders, in correct circumstances,
following the proper protocols, and so on.  Moral obligations concerning
transmission went both ways.   Since the Speeches themselves were
sentient beings and were tied to agential substances, their transmission
and acquisition required care.   Knowledge transmitted inappropriately
could attack either giver or receiver, or simply sulk and cease to work.  
For instance, Speeches could become resentful if not properly paid for
with tobacco, and could harm their original owner for not treating them
as something dear to him.  Knowledge acquired too quickly and in excess
could madden receivers, and it was the obligation of concerned elders to
make sure they did not give others Speeches carelessly.   (See Overing
1993:191–211; and Lagrou intra, on the dangers of excess among the
Piaroa and Kaxinawa respectively).
People of the Center also made much of the ownership of knowledge.  
Such ownership was linked to the very nature of groupings and individuals,
as represented in Speeches of Apprising, and in much other rhetoric as
well.   The idea was that the Grandfather of Creation had created the
different patrilines, clans, and language groups in different ways, and had
given to each its strain of tobacco and its Speeches.  These Speeches were
transmitted patrilineally, in the case of tobacco constituting the very bodies
of members of patrilines and clans, who were thus consubstantial among
themselves and therefore supposedly similar in subjectivities, proclivities,
and vulnerabilities.  Therefore, though many Speeches and rituals were the
same between different groups, some were unique to particular lineages and
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clans because they addressed unique aspects of lineage-specific creation
and bodily constitution.  Ignoring such knowledge, or preferring another
group’s knowledge, were dangerous matters that could generate trouble or
criticism for the unorthodox.  Immanuel, for instance, once told me he had
followed proper Muinane protocols when bringing his wooden drum into
the maloca, while his own father had unwisely had his brought in, many
years before, following a Uitoto rather than Muinane protocol.  
ON THE DESIRE FOR PREDATORY AGENCY
People of the Center’s accounts of the nature of agency in the cosmos
were linked to their inevitable ambivalence towards violence, hate, and
anger.  The latter were often mentioned as the most salient manifestations
of animal thoughts/emotions.  These emotions were the object of many
abstract prescriptions that warned against their capacity to destroy life and
relationships, and were likely to be harshly criticized when actually made
manifest.  Nonetheless, men in particular seemed to be obsessed with the
idea of being capable of angrily killing, harming, scolding, or proscribing
evil or threatening agents in the world (whether anthropomorphic or not).  
Their expressions of this ranged from (1) David’s and Abel’s numerous
reports about having scolded this or that person, through (2) the lighthearted bravado of Lázaro’s youngest son, a youth of seventeen or so, who
addressed a bolt of lightning by saying to an audience of a boatful of brothers,
sisters, and myself: “You try that again and I’ll grab you by the tail!” to (3)
claims of Immanuel’s that seemed to require greater commitment to the
suspension of disbelief.  He often produced Speeches to disarm thunder,
and once, when I asked him why vampires killed his chickens but would
not bite those of us who lived in his maloca, he said: “Do you think that I
would allow them to live, if they did that?  They are afraid!”
I believe part of the reason for their ambivalence lay in the predatory
nature of agency as they understood and valued it.  To be moral human
beings and men of knowledge, men not only had to be cool and sociable,
they also had to prey upon evil agential beings in the world, beings with
whom some interlocution was possible.  However, the powers that made
them dangerous to evil beings were also capable of harming them and
other innocent human beings.15
Such was the interest of a few individuals in dangerous agency or in
portraying themselves as dangerously agential, that some would admit
to knowledge of sorcery.  Onan once told me that he pitied anyone who
would try to ensorcell him or his people, explaining that it was easy for
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him or anyone who knew good Speeches to “flip them over” and turn
them into sorcerous spells that sickened or killed human victims.  Pedro
and his brothers would probably have deemed such interest and claims to
manifest an immoral constitution, something Onan knew well.  I see such
claims rather as privileging the ideal of being an agent capable of dealing
effectively with outside threats, and in Onan’s case, as an intentional
portrayal of himself as capable of great esoteric violence.  
Onan’s father Saul once expressed to me his interest in developing a
new capacity to harm people through esoteric knowledge.  He had heard
about a practice (I imagine it was Vodou) that involved using pictures
of victims in order to hurt them, and he wanted me to teach him this
skill.  I do not recall my immediate reaction, but he quickly added that he
would not use it to ensorcell people, only for defense.  Subsequent events
persuaded me that he had a certain human target in mind.  I believe he
knew that this would be deemed sorcery by some of his fellow Muinane
mambeadores, but also that he really desired an efficacious, death-dealing
capability, even one as redolent of sorcery as the one in question.16
A MORAL EXEMPLAR
One of the most seductive ideals of masculine agency among People
of the Center and some neighbouring groups was reified in the image of
the knowledgeable mambeador, seated in an unwavering posture, “rooted”
in his place, attending single-mindedly to moral, esoteric matters in the
mambeadero and effectively defending himself and his people from evil.17  
For the mambeadero was indeed the place par excellence for the deployment
of knowledge.   It was from a seated position in this circle of seats that
a man’s Speeches were best buttressed and empowered by the tobacco
and other substances of his lineage, by the agencies consigned in the very
makings of his maloca, and by his kin.  Moreover, some Speeches could
only be produced (at night) in the mambeadero of the maloca of a member
of the patriline to which those Speeches belonged.  
In talking about “sitting firmly,” several mambeadores brought into
account a connection between a mambeador’s life process and the tobacco
plant’s.  Both started life as vulnerable beings.  The tender young tobacco
plant that first sprouted from the ground was still so fragile and loose that
any breeze could uproot it.   Similarly, a boy or recently initiated youth
could easily be swayed from the “path” of proper development and become
flitting, undisciplined, weak, and inconstant.  With time and proper care,
however, both the mambeador and the tobacco matured.  Mature tobacco
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had deep, strong roots that no wind could uproot.  The Nonuya man who
best explained this to me spoke admiringly about the mature mambeador,
who had a tobacco “tree” rooted in his abdomen.    It was this tobacco
tree that kept him firmly rooted at the moral center of his world, the
mambeadero.   Such a man featured a keen awareness of propriety and
impropriety, and had the strength, the control, and the presence of mind
to reject all temptation to misbehave and violate the prescriptions of his
forefathers.   He recognized what knowledge belonged to him and his
people, and what belonged to others.  Unlike a flitting youth, the “wind”
of others’ knowledge did not unseat him or seduce him into forgetting his
own.  Furthermore, in the process of aging and transforming into paste
as described in Speeches of Apprising, tobacco becomes an unstoppable
predator that can destroy all enemies.  Ideally, this is also true of men.
That men and women found the highly aesthetic picture of a man
sitting firmly in a mambeadero to be an ideal of agency seemed to me to
be evident as well in their use of the term “to sit” as a common metonym
to refer to a person’s—a man’s, but also sometimes a woman’s—judicious
reaction to important challenges.  Numerous times I witnessed speakers
producing a certain gesture to accompany this metonymic reference.  They
would half-sit in an imaginary seat as if with elbows solidly planted on
their knees or thighs, hands close to but not touching their heads.  They
would tighten their arm muscles in a quick, visible gesture.   This produced
a recognizable semblance of a mambeador.  
The persuasiveness of this image—its promise of agency and
morality—buttressed, and was in turn buttressed by, its association with
rhetoric about and practices of virilocal postmarital residence, patrilineal
corporativity and, for Muinane people, if not other People of the Center,
the patrilineal inflection of their kinship terminology.
I recall an instance when a Yukuna woman who happened to live in a
Muinane community told David that since he was a traditional leader, he
ought to stop traveling to meetings in other communities and cities, and
to sit.  She protested that he was no longer a young man to be traipsing
around.   His task now was to sit and to guard his people from within
the mambeadero.  David was deeply offended by this, though he himself
had requested that all who had criticisms produce them right there, rather
than in his absence.  He retorted that his community was thankless, and
that he had nobody trustworthy to send off to meetings, or even worthy
interlocutors.  
Immanuel’s brother Aurelio provided me with a nice description of a
stereotypical man of knowledge, which reiterated as well the association
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between agency, masculinity and the mambeadero: “That man may speak as
if scolding, but it is only from the throat outwards.  Inside, he has a calm, a
love … One hears him conversing pleasantly in the mambeadero, sometimes
joking, with enthusiasm … but that very man can say “Dáigéjííraana!” (Do
not rain!), and the rain stops.”  This anecdote cited an ideal of masculine
agency that featured a combination of sociability and benevolence with
great esoteric capability.  
QUOTING OTHERS IN CLAIMS TO KNOWLEDGE
Many of the self-portrayals individual People of the Center produced
described the speaker with quoted evaluations by third parties.   These
descriptions showed me that people were attentive to others’ views of
them, or at least that positing third person views to describe or account
for themselves was acceptable (see Oakdale 2005).  There was much else
in their everyday talk that indicated that they were keenly attentive to
others’ perceptions and judgments of them.  The call for such attentiveness
was even formulaic in the Speech of Advice, where many counsels warned
youths that if they behaved in certain ways, others would criticize, ask who
of their kin raised them so carelessly, and so on.  Furthermore, people were
explicitly aware of the barrage of critical commentary constantly going on
in their own and neighbouring communities.  
Caleb, a Uitoto man married to a Muinane woman, proffered a
particularly nice example of a self-portrayal in which the speaker quoted
another’s evaluation of him.  However, his self-portrayal had an interesting
twist.  The character who portrayed Caleb as knowledgeable, and whose
voice he animated, was the spirit of a dead man with whom Caleb said he
had spoken in a yagé vision.  
On the occasion in question, Caleb, speaking in Spanish, told several
of us seated with him in the mambeadero about discovering that it had been
his now dead uncle Nimrod who had ensorcelled and thereby killed many
people in the region in previous years.  Caleb said his mother had prepared
yagé for him and that upon drinking it he had had ugly, unpleasant visions.  
Nonetheless, in his vision he had arrived at his uncle’s mambeadero, and had
seen the uncle surrounded by paraphernalia for sorcery.  “It is you, uncle!”
Caleb claimed he had said, a phrase that was both a standard greeting
and an accusatory statement.   He described how his uncle had looked
at him and said, “I, who remained undiscovered by elders and men of
knowledge, am now discovered by a mere orphan!”  I understood Nimrod’s
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contribution, as acted out by Caleb, to express a mix of irritation, surprise,
and admiration.
Here, Caleb was making a claim to esoteric perspicacity and superior
knowledge.  Yagé was widely deemed in the region to have an all-revealing
character, for supposedly drinkers could “see everything.”  They could see
through the flesh of individuals and identify sorcerous pathogenic objects
placed in their bodies.  They could witness past and future events, including
sorcerous rituals, and nothing they chose to look into would remain
a mystery.   However, they also stated that great sorcerers could escape
lesser people’s sight.   Only somebody (usually an old man) well versed
in the esoteric and with great knowledge could “catch” a reportedly able
sorcerer like Nimrod.  However, Caleb cited a fairly commonly used image
that sometimes subverted the emphasis on age as a condition of wisdom:
that of the orphan.  Orphans, bereft of kin, unprotected, without mentors
focusing on them, nonetheless appeared in some Speeches of Apprising18
as uniquely capable sages who became knowledgeable and agential while
listening to others’ stories and doing their menial jobs, and who surged from
anonymity and low status to achieve great things.  Caleb was not literally
an orphan, in the sense that he did have a father.  However, his father’s
patriline’s elders had been murdered before he could learn from them,
and so in that sense he had been orphaned of his patriline’s knowledge.  
By claiming to be an orphan, I think, Caleb was modeling himself after
the image of somebody who would surprise others by acquiring skills and
agency beyond what would be expected of him.  That it had been a very
knowledgeable, if evil, old man who had purportedly described Caleb this
way (when Caleb discovered him), as opposed to it being merely Caleb’s
own claim, constituted stronger evidence of his agency.  I am persuaded
that he wanted to be related to as such an agent.  
ON THE EFFECTS OF MORAL SELF-PORTRAYALS
Let me briefly consider some of the effects actual moral self-portrayals
actually have, or might have, on social life.  A final anecdote will help me
do so.  
Lazarus was telling me that Abel, a young man from another clan, had
once sat with him in his mambeadero:   
He (Abel) said to me (Lazarus): “Yo ya tengo mando [I already have power].”  
He always aplasta [flattens, causes to capitulate or be silent] Pedro and Pablo,
and all they say to him is “Íímino [“Good” or “all right,” in Muinane] … but
that day I blocked him.  I asked him, “And who gave you that power?”  He
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said that Saul, Methuselah, Immanuel and Lot.  So I said to him, “So let’s see,
where is it?  Where is that of which you speak?”  He did not have anything
to show, so I said, “One should never say that if one has nothing to show…
and less so to me, who just had to give you coca and tobacco paste because
you have none of your own.”  Then I said to him, “Never again talk to me
thus, saying trash like that.”  He said that I was right, and that he had learned
an important point that day.  So then I said, “What if I were to ask you to
heal that boy there?”  Benjamin [a baby] was sick that day, trembling.  “Do
you know how to stop that?”  He said “No.”  So where  does that leave you, if
somebody requests that you do so?19

Abel had made a claim to knowledge and agency, and Lazarus had
treated it as outrageous in the circumstances, highlighting that Abel did
not even have tobacco paste or coca to produce as evidence and support
for his claim.   As told by Lazarus, he also provided further warning of
future shame to Abel, should he not be able to heal a child when requested
to do so by others who heard his bragging.   Lazarus achieved several
things through this anecdote.  First, he reproduced an image of agential
knowledge that featured production and healing as its central purposes, and
the premise that there was a certain kind of evidence for such knowledge.  
Second, he made what I believe was his intended point, namely, that he
himself was a tough and capable mambeador with the material evidence to
back this up, and that he had taught a young upstart a lesson.20 Abel’s own
words, directly or indirectly quoted, were “evidence” that this was not just
Lazarus’s account but also Abel’s perception.  Third, he contributed to the
maintenance of the footings of our relationship.  Lazarus was my host at
the time, and frequently pressed upon me that he was a man of knowledge.  
As usual, I listened to his anecdotes with interest and responded in what I
believed to be the preferred fashion.  In this case, I expressed satisfaction
upon hearing about Abel being put in his place (I was sincerely delighted).   
I treated him in such a way that it was clear that I accepted his character
as a man of knowledge.  Between Lazarus’s claims and questions and my
own, we managed to be on excellent footing.  
In contrast to Lazarus’s successful claims, and through the refraction
of Lazarus’s account, Abel’s own moral self-portrayal to the effect that
he “had power” appears to me to have been infelicitous, for Lazarus not
only did not accept Abel’s statement, but strongly refused the egalitarian
footings that Abel’s tone and claim would seem to have tried to posit
and enact.  This was also an example—though a rather franker one than
usual—of the kind of contestation of knowledge that People of the Center
know to be likely.  
Anecdotes such as Lazarus’s (and Abel’s purported one) cite, and
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depend upon, local accounts of human ontogeny, competence, and
subjectivity for their intelligibility.   Thus, one of the effects was that
Lazarus and Abel made their accounts and symbolic associations available
anew to others, including me, for interpretation, citation, transformation,
or rejection.  Furthermore, they provided listeners and interlocutors with a
frame for the interpretation of speakers’ actions.  In this sense they could be
“felicitous” occurrences, such as when listeners accepted the anecdotes and
were willing to interpret other actions of the speakers in their light, or they
could be “infelicitous,” such as when both speakers’ telling of the anecdotes
and other actions they performed were taken to be manifestations of some
undesirable feature of the speakers, and when the respondents contested
the self-portrayal.   Finally, these self-portrayals and critiques, like most
other uses of language, were parts of dialogues that set, maintained, or
changed the tone of interactions and the footings of relationships.  
DISCUSSION
This essay is the product of my curiosity about the striking number
of moral portrayals and critiques that individuals among People of the
Center produced concerning matters of knowledge.  My initial claim was
that they were motivated by a certain ideal of agency, a sense of what was
admirable or desirable in human subjectivity and action, and by awareness
of the possibility that their actions and subjectivities could be framed as
immoral, animalistic, or otherwise inadequate by others around them.  
This was a gendered ideal of agency.   On the one hand there was the
complex image of the “true man” (imíyagaifi), a man of knowledge, tied
to his patriline and to its land, and capable of contributing to the proper
course of everyday life there, be it through his own sociable action or
through dangerous predatory knowledge and esoteric violence.   On the
other hand (which I did not explore here) there was the “true woman”
(imíyagaigo): hard-working, conscientious, generous, caring, and faithful.  
Both men and women tended to help reproduce these ideals, for both
genders.  (On differences in gendered agencies, see Belaunde, intra.)
To make my initial claim plausible, I discussed several matters:
Muinane accounts of agency—of thoughts/emotions and action—in the
cosmos, the coherence of which I believe contributed to their compelling
character; Muinane people’s attentiveness to and awareness of other’s
perceptions and evaluations of their subjectivities and actions; instances of
talk that suggest an intent to persuade others of speakers’ knowledge and
agency; and the possible effects of such instances of talk.  
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Part of what makes this claim plausible for me is that I find some moral
self-portrayals of People of the Center as akin, in a limited sense, to the
ostentatious manly gesturing I remember deploying in my own society.  I
remember instances in my adolescence when I intentionally and reflexively
produced a certain style of walking, talking, or otherwise interacting
with others, in situations when I suspected that I would otherwise not
be perceived in a manner that fit in with what I aspired to be.   I also
recognized that other individuals did the same.  We self-consciously chose
forms of ostentatious expression that “corresponded” to our aspired ideal
of manliness—an ideal that also fits into a more or less coherent cosmos.  I
have the sense that others also may have questioned individuals’ manliness,
or deemed their “manly” gestures phony or contrived, but “manliness” itself
as a norm or ideal was only rarely questioned.   It was usually taken for
granted as a feature of agents in a certain kind of world.  As I understand it,
the ideal and value of manliness in question was itself a social achievement,
the processual product of people’s reiterations of the forms that constitute
manliness.21
The talk about knowledge and practices of knowledge engaged in by
Muinane people made sense in the context of a certain kind of world, a
coherent one in which the nature of embodied selfhood was tied to that
of livelihood practices, and these to moral action, and all of these to the
character of inter- and intraspecific relations in the cosmos, and in turn to
the workings of great rituals.  Theirs was a world populated by different
kinds of beings who interrelated in certain ways, and where people’s bodies
were constituted by different substances that determined their identity,
their subjectivity, their actions, and, in general, their agency.  In that world,
people were axiomatically moral.  However, outside agents—animals and
other morally inhuman beings—could impinge upon them and cause
them to experience and manifest immoral subjectivities, in fact extracting
them from the category of Real People.  Through rituals—small everyday
rituals, or occasional great ones—Real People were made, shaped, healed,
or reconstituted, to ensure their health and sociability.
Muinane people’s talk about, and practice of, knowledge and the
world, translated into persuasive, plausible, self-referring accounts of
phenomenological experience—of thoughts/emotions and motivations—
and had a strong hold on them.   It also shaped their grasp of agency,
defining a sense of who they and others around them could and should
be, including a sense of what was manly (or properly womanly), admirable,
and dignified action, and thus how they could and should act.  People used
the terms of such talk to construe their circumstances, interactions, and
identities, and to interpret their own subjectivities.  I witnessed situations
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when people talked about their own past thoughts/emotions and actions,
basically persuaded that these had not been their own but rather stemmed
from extrinsic beings and substances.  In some cases, this seemed to have
led them to change their view of themselves and of significant others, and
to act on the basis of this new perception.
Their images of desirable agency had implications to much in everyday
life in Muinane communities, including aspects of practice typically
considered as subject matter for anthropology, such as social organization.  
Muinane and Uitoto men tended to live in communities that were mostly
corporate patrilines, but sometimes they did not.  A rich description of their
social organizational patterns would require attention to the motivations
and self-conscious choices of individuals who created these patterns.  For
instance, the ideal of rootedness, of being tied to a patriline and its land,
seemed to have been an important consideration for some men when
deciding not to leave the settlement where they lived with their brothers,
and where there was much unpleasant conflict.  
Much of the talk of People of the Center showed that they were
attentive to others’ evaluations of behavior, and a few times I heard people
refer explicitly to the critical commentary that was rife in their communities.  
Thus, they were aware of the likelihood that they themselves would be
targeted and that their expressions of knowledge or claims were unlikely
to be taken at face value by all and accepted as true.  Contestations, private
or open, were likely.  In this context—seeking to be and/or appearing to
be specimens of an ideal of moral agency, and in order to preempt contrary
interpretations of their actions and subjectivities—People of the Center
were called upon and motivated to produce talk and other ostentatious
manifestations of knowledge and morality.  They did so in order to persuade
others and to achieve certain effects.  I am of the opinion that this was
often the situation that led individuals to produce moral self-portrayals.  
NOTES
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1.  Uitoto, Muinane, Andoke, Ocaina, Bora, Miraña and Nonuya-speaking
patrilineal clans of the Caquetá-Putumayo river area of Colombia.  See Espinosa
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Arango (1995:304); Echeverri (1997:2); Karadimas (1997); Griffiths (1998); and  
Londoño Sulkin (2001, 2004).
2. The concern in question is something I picked up from Joanna Overing
when I was her student.  It was then reinforced over the years as I realized, again
and again, how perspicacious and appropriate her emphasis on morality was when
attending to Amazonian (and other) people’s social lives.  It seems clear to me
that her interest in matters of morality is one of her most salient legacies and the
most consistently shared feature in the work of her students and admirers in this
volume.
3.   Mambe was the Spanish term for a mix of toasted and powdered coca
leaves and the ashes of Cecropia leaves.  The verbal form was mambear, and this
was done by packing the green powder into the cheeks and keeping it there for
slow absorption.  The main, but not only, place for coca consumption was the
mambeadero, a circle of seats situated somewhere inside the maloca.  
4.  According to Conklin (2001:38), writing about Wari’ people, “The biggest
control on individual behavior is acute sensitivity to public opinion and criticism.”  
See also Basso (1995:29).
5.  I follow Charles Taylor’s use of the term to refer to “distinctions between
things which are recognized as of categoric or unconditioned or higher importance
or worth and things which lack this or are of lesser value” (Taylor 1985:3).
6.  I must note, however, that these pictures did not constitute an exhaustive,
monolithic culture.   People sometimes spoke in different terms about these
matters.
7.   I am attending here to Cohen’s (1994:5, 6) and Overing and Passes”
(2000) call for attention to individual consciousness, and to Taylor’s (1985:294)
arguments to the effect that human beings are self-interpreting animals whose
interpretations involve qualitative distinctions of worth.  
8.   The Spanish term “conocimiento propio” has no simple translation in
Muinane.  However, the linguist Consuelo Vengoechea (personal communication)
refers to it as “Ifásitu,” following an informant’s statement.   I understand that
Muinane term merely to mean “all parts” or “the whole thing,” and not to be a
univocal name for the category of knowledge.  Vengoechea (1995) has carried out
research on the Muinane language (see also Landaburu 1996).  
9.  Both men and women stressed that women did not have the “capacity” for
conocimiento propio—they found it not to suit women’s bodily constitution, and
vice versa.
10.  See Echeverri’s (1997:250) excellent example of a performative discourse
among the Uitoto (without using the term “performative,” though).   See
also Griffiths (1998:72, 206) for other similar rites among Uitoto.   Tambiah’s
(1968:190–193) lists of phrases and words for gardening magic in Melanesia is
very similar to People of the Center’s.
11.  The title of my piece “Though It Comes as Evil, I Embrace It as Good
…” (Londoño Sulkin 2000:170–186) is a Muinane aphorism that refers to the
desirability of “naming” the poisonous, the tragic, the undesirable, the disgusting,
and so on, into their “good” counterparts.  
12.  Cf. Santos-Granero (1991:12) and Echeverri (1997:195) on the moral
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use of knowledge among Yanesha and Uitoto people respectively.
13.  Beauty can be a manifestation of morality, or else mere appearance, with no
real substance behind it to guarantee its moral results.  Cf. Overing (1985a:284).
14.   Cf. Overing (1985b:167–169) on “truth” and moral coherence and
correctness.
15.  There is an excellent discussion of a similar existential problem among
the Piaroa, in Overing (2006).
16.  On the near identity of sorcerous and benevolent shamanism, see SantosGranero (1991:338); Vidal and Whitehead (2004:67, 76); and Wright (2004:83).
17.   Cf. Griffiths (1998:163) on the concept of “sitting firmly” among the
Uitoto, and Belaunde (1992:103) on the Peruvian Airo-Pai’s valuation of “erectness
of posture” as a manifestation of moral personal disposition.   Alès (2000:133–
151) discusses both “sitting” and “standing” as matters of attention among the
Yanomami.
18.  The Uitoto term for the stories that Muinane people call “Speeches of
Apprising” is “Ropes of the Ancients” (Echeverri, personal communication).
19.  This is an excerpt from my diary, and not of a recorded and transcribed
conversation.
20.  I do not mean to posit that language carries meaning.  Rather, I wish to
say that we deploy language with intent, and others make their own meanings
out of it.  I do think people converge somewhat in their interpretations, though
differences are undeniable.  
21.  My argument here is inspired by Butler (1993:288).
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